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‘NOT A RELIGIOUS STATE’
A study of three Indonesian religious leaders on the relation of
state and religion
Al Makin
Sociology of Religion, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University (UIN), Yogyakarta, Indonesia
ABSTRACT
This article explores the concept of a ‘secular state’ offered by three
Indonesian religious leaders: a Catholic priest, Nicolaus Driyarkara
(1913–1967), and two Muslim intellectuals who were also state
officials, Mukti Ali (1923–2004) and Munawir Sjadzali (1925–2004).
All three, who represented the immediate generation after the
revolution for Indonesian independence from the Dutch (1945),
defended the legitimacy of a secular state for Indonesia based on
the state ideology Pancasila (Five Principles of Indonesia). In doing
so, they argued that a religious state, for example an Islamic state,
is incompatible with a plural nation that has diverse cultures,
faiths, and ethnicities. The three also argued that the state should
remain neutral about its citizens’ faith and should not be
dominated by a single religion, i.e. Islam. Instead, the state is
obliged to protect all religions embraced by Indonesians. This
argument becomes a vital foundation in the establishment of
Indonesia’s trajectory of unique ‘secularisation’. Whilst these three
intellectuals opposed the idea of establishing a religious or Islamic
state in Indonesia, it was not because they envisioned the decline
of the role of religion in politics and the public domain but rather
that they regarded religiosity in Indonesia as vital in nation
building within a multi-religious society. In particular, the two
Muslim leaders used religious legitimacy to sustain the New
Order’s political stability, and harnessed state authority to
modernise the Indonesian Islamic community.
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Introduction
Theories and practices of ‘secularisation’ have been revisited in many studies (Asad
2003; Casanova 1994, 2006; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). The practices of the separation
of state and religion are indeed dynamic and never monolithic. Each country may offer
different interpretation and policies with regard to the position of religion in national
politics (Beckford 2003: 101). For example, France seeks to consistently hold the prin-
ciple of laïcité, whereas the USA still regards faith in God as an important element in
the citizens’ patriotism (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Muslim countries, however,
adopt their own policies with regard to positioning Islam in politics. Most of the
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Middle Eastern Muslim countries were ruled by military or traditional authoritarian
governments, which were later toppled by the Arab Spring movement. Among other
Muslim countries, however, the politics of Indonesia can perhaps be compared to that
of Turkey (Kersten 2014; Makin 2016b), where secularisation goes hand in hand with
nationalism despite the fact that the two countries are dominated by a Muslim popu-
lation (Barton 2010: 472). Indonesia, with the largest Muslim population in the world,
is particularly unique as the majority support secular and nationalist political parties
rather than Islamist parties in many general elections (Baswedan 2004; Mujani and
Liddle 2009). However, amid the late wave of democratisation in the country, particu-
larly after the fall of Suharto, public piety surged as a consequence of the rise of conser-
vatism and a growing orthodoxy (Barton 2005; Hefner 2000: 84; Makin 2009, 2015,
2016b, 2016c).
It is noteworthy that most Muslim countries in the Middle East are struggling to
formulate the position of Islamic religious sentiment in politics.1 However, Indonesia
since the beginning of its independence in the mid twentieth century, has formulated
its own concept of adapting the principles of secularisation with religious faith. Most
studies of secularisation in Indonesia have focused on either the earlier period of the
struggle for independence, such as Sukarno or M. Natsir (Elson 2009; Ismail 2004;
Latif 2011) or later generation intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005)
or Abdurrachman Wachid (Assyaukanie 2009a, 2009b; Barton 1999, 2010; Kull
2005; Nurdin 2016; Rochmat 2015). This article explores the development of the
concept of secularisation proposed by intellectuals immediately after the indepen-
dence but prior to Madjid. We will also see that Madjid’s famous secular slogan
‘Islam yes, Islamic party no’ was preceded by the ideas of three intellectuals, Nicolaus
Driyarkara, Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali, and that we should not directly connect
Madjid’s ideas to those of early Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno. This article
focuses on three prominent religious leaders: Driyarkara, a Catholic priest, and
Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali who were Muslim intellectuals and served as Min-
isters of Religious Affairs under the New Order government. Whilst there has been
much written about Mukti Ali and Sjadzali by Indonesian writers (on e.g. Mukti
Ali for his ideas and programmes on inter-religious dialogues and Sjadzali, for the
contextualisation of Islamic law [ fiqh] in Indonesia),2 Driyarkara has received the
least attention by scholars within the country and abroad.3 Comparing the three
will shed light on the parallel ideas these two Muslim thinkers with their Catholic
counterpart.
1Various studies as to why most of the Arab countries struggled to establish democracy from the pre- to post-Arab Spring
cover historical, economic, social, theological, and political factors (Diamond et al. 2003). In the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, that toppled many Arab authoritarian and militaristic regimes, the democratic movements in the region faced
awakening Islamism which prevailed over the waves of democratisation, leading to conflicts in many countries, such
as Libya and Syria (Bradley 2012; Pupcenoks 2012). Unsurprisingly, given the more successful transition from Suharto’s
authoritarian regime to democracy in Indonesia in 1998 than that of the countries during the Arab Spring, there have
been efforts to promote Indonesia as a model for other Muslim countries (Hoesterey 2013).
2Many Indonesian Muslim scholars have paid attention to Mukti Ali (Basuki 2013; Husin 2014; Ismail 2012; Makin 2012;
Munhanif 1996) and Sjadzali (Effendy 1995; Fitria 2012; Gunarto 2007; Ilyas 2006; Madjid 1995; Sembodo 2005; Tobiba-
tussaadah 2014).
3There is a compilation of his works (Driyarkara 2006a) but few have written about him (Haryono and Baryadi 2013; Sutrisno
2000; Ziadi 2013).
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Brief biographies of Driyarkara, Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali
Nicolaus Driyarkara (1913–1967)
Driyarkara was born on 13 June 1913 in the mountainous area of Menoreh Purworejo,
Central Java, and called Soehirman. He was later also known as Djenthu. He went to
Volksschool and Vervolgschool in Cangkrep Purworejo and then continued his education
at the HIS (Hollandsch Inlandsche School/Dutch-medium elementary school for natives)4
in Purworejo and Malang. In 1935, he entered a Catholic seminary in Girisontha, Central
Java, and took the name Driyarkara when joining the Jesuit Order (Syarekat Jesuit).
Driyarkara also studied philosophy in Muntilan, Central Java, where he learnt Latin
and Greek. In 1947 he was ordained as a Catholic priest by Mgr Soegijapranoto, the
first Bishop of Semarang. Driyarkara further pursued his theological studies in Maastricht,
Netherlands (1949), and Drongen in Belgium, and was awarded a doctorate (1950–1952)
at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. His dissertation (1952), ‘Theoria partici-
pationis in Existentia Dei Percipienda secundum Nicolaum Malebranche’ (Embracing the
theory of participation in the existence of Nicolas Malebranche) focused on the way one
can understand the role of God in the world and human life according to the French phi-
losopher and Oratorian priest, Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), whose influence upon
later writings by Diryarkara remains visible. On many occasions Driyarkara demonstrated
that it is possible to be a rational philosopher, without losing faith in God.5 Driyarkara is
known for his works dealing with broad interests from ethics, philosophy, education, to
Indonesian character building. He taught philosophy and ethics at Ignatius College Yogya-
karta and later became the rector of Sanata Dharma Institute of Education (1955–1967).
He received a professorship from the University of Indonesia and was visiting professor at
the University of St Louis in the US (1963–1964). He also was involved in state adminis-
tration, serving as a member of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS,
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara) from 1962 to 1967, and of the Supreme
Advisory Council (DPA, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung)6 from 1965 to 1967 (Danuwinata
2006).
Driyarkara’s ideas initially were known only among Indonesian Catholics as he regu-
larly contributed to the column, ‘Serat Saking Roma’ (Letters from Rome; 1951–1952)
in the Javanese-language magazine Praba. His writings discussed in accessible language
critical issues ranging from liberalism, communism, poverty, to war victims. On his
return to Indonesia, Driyarkara (2006e) carried on writing for Praba with his column,
‘Warung Podjok’ (Corner Café) under the pen name Pak Nala (1952–1955). In these
articles he touched on pertinent topics in Indonesian politics, such as parliamentary
issues, democracy, corruption, demonstrations and economic inflation. Driyarkara
gained a broader readership when he wrote for the Indonesian-language magazine
Basis,7 under yet another pen name, Puruhita. His themes in Basis shifted to deeper phi-
losophical reflections. From 1953 to 1965 he served as its editor-in-chief when he was also
4HIS were established in 1914 under the spirit of Ethical Policy adopted by the Dutch colonialists to improve education.
5Nicolas Malebranche was known for combining rationalist Cartesian approaches and those of St Augustine and René Des-
cartes. Malebranche stressed elsewhere the mighty role of God in the world and human affairs, and that it is possible to
feel the presence of God through reasoning. In this regard he is also known as belonging to Occasionalism (Driyarkara
2006f: 1385–1452).
6DPA abolished in 2003.
7Published since 1951.
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the dean of education at the Sanata Dharma Institute. Thus his name was known more
widely in two fields: philosophy and education. Driyarkara’s philosophical reflections
mostly present themes on God, nature and human beings, within the context of Indonesia
at a critical period of political transition. He was interested in a person’s free will and
responsibility, and the importance of developing a critical attitude and reflection
towards a maturity of human thought (Soedjatmoko 1967). Driyarkara’s position as a
Catholic priest can be seen in his reflections in which he called upon readers to be
closer to God (Hassan 1972). However, his greatest contribution to Indonesia for the
purpose of this article is his philosophical reflection on the importance of Pancasila for
Indonesia as a nation, and particularly, the role of religion in the country (Danuwinata
2006).
Mukti Ali (1923–2004)
Mukti Ali was born in 1923 and called Boedjono. He was educated in the Dutch school
system and sat for the Klein Ambtenaar Examen (civil service examination). His
parents then sent him to a pesantren in Termas, East Java, where he learnt the Qur’an,
Arabic, Islamic rituals, jurisprudence, and Sufism. His pesantren teacher, Abdul Hamid,
gave him a new name, Mukti Ali. He continued his education at the STI (Sekolah
Tinggi Islam, Islamic Higher Education) in Yogyakarta in 1945, which later became UII
(Universitas Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic University). At university, Mukti Ali
met Muhammdiyah activist Mas Mansur. Thus, Mukti Ali experienced both NU (Nahdla-
tul Ulama) traditions during his early pesantren education in East Java and the Muham-
madiyah environment during his higher education in Yogyakarta. In 1949, he made a
pilgrimage to Mecca and went from there to Pakistan to study Islamic history at the
Arabic literature department of the University of Karachi. He gained his doctorate in
1955 and proceeded to McGill University for an MA in Islamic Studies in 1957. His
varied academic background influenced his interest in comparative religions which he
developed in his later career as an intellectual and official under the New Order
(Damami et al. 1993).8 Mukti Ali started his career as a civil servant in the education
section of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and was lecturer at PTAIN (Perguruan
Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Higher Education) in Yogyakarta and ADIA
(Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama, Academy for Islamic Education) in Jakarta, both of
which later became IAINs (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institutes for Islamic
Studies). In Jakarta he taught English and served as the secretary of the adab (literature)
faculty. However, he was asked to create a new department of comparative religion for the
ushuluddin (philosophy and Islamic thought) faculty in IAIN Yogyakarta where he served
as the department head. In 1964 he was its vice-rector of academic affairs. His intellectual
endeavour developed well in Yogyakarta, as he taught various subjects: sociology and psy-
chology of religions, modern Islamic thought, and contemporary philosophy. His con-
cerns about Islamic high school education was centred on two disadvantages among
academics: lack of English skills and the problem of methodology. In response to this,
he pioneered a graduate study programme (pascasarjana) in Yogyakarta. Mukti Ali was
8For Mukti Ali’s biography see e.g. Damami et al. (1993); Dja’far (2006); Husin (2014); Ismail (2012); Makin (2012); Munhanif
(1996).
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a prolific writer who also served as the editor-in-chief of the Islamic studies journal Al-
Jam‘iah in 1964. His writings also appeared in the Syiar Islam and Panji Masyarakat
magazines. After the 1965 communist upheaval, he founded a group called Lingkaran
Diskusi Limited, holding discussions each Friday night, and attended regularly by
Dawam Rahardjo (b.1942), Djohan Effendi (b.1939), and Ahmad Wahib (1942–1973).9
The group is widely known for generating liberal and progressive ideas in Islamic intellec-
tual circles in Indonesia. It also invited prominent Indonesian and non-Indonesian scho-
lars, such as Deliar Noer, W.S. Rendra, Lafran Pane, B.J. Boland, Y.W.M Bakker, Niels
Mulder, James Peacock, and others. Among Mukti Ali’s students in Yogyakarta were
Amin Abdullah, Alef Theria Wasim, Burhanuddin Daja, Djama’annuri (Makin 2012).
Ali’s influence on later generations of Yogyakarta intellectuals can be seen in his students’
attitude to religion and Islam. Notable among his students was Amin Abdullah, serving
twice as the rector of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta and known
for promoting multi-dimensional approaches in the study of Islam. Amin Abdullah also
reinterpreted the border between the ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ in Islamic theology (Abdullah
1995, 1996).
In 1971 Mukti Ali was appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. During his tenure, his
first attention was to give religious legitimacy to the New Order by promoting ‘national
development’. For Mukti Ali, development should focus not only on economic or material
aspects, but also on the spiritual and religious. Thus, he coined the expression ‘material
and spiritual development’, which served as the ideological foundation of the New
Order government. In this regard Mukti Ali served as a bridge connecting the govern-
ment’s interest in national development and Muslim legitimacy to actively participate
in it. It is also noteworthy that during Mukti Ali’s tenure the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indo-
nesia), the leading Muslim clerical body comprising all Indonesian Muslim groups, was
founded in 1975 to support this purpose. His second contribution to the government
and Indonesian religious communities was the promotion of inter-religious dialogue, tol-
erance, and harmony. Mukti Ali also coined the phrase ‘agreement in disagreement’
(setuju dalam ketidaksetujuan), by which he meant that adherents of different faiths
can communicate and cooperate with each other despite differences in beliefs and religious
teachings. He also reformed Islamic education by establishing state Islamic high schools
(MAN/Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) and giving these the same status as other state high
schools which would allow the graduates to continue their education at state universities.
Finally, in reforming Islamic education, Mukti Ali gave full support for IAIN lecturers to
study abroad in bothWestern andMiddle Eastern universities (Damami et al. 1993: 38–9).
Munawir Sjadzali (1925–2004)
Munawir Sjadzali was born in Klaten, Central Java, in 1925. Like Mukti Ali, his early edu-
cation was in various pesantren (Azra and Umam 1998; Feener 2007b: 137; Sjadzali 1995).
9These three Muslim intellectuals have become symbols of Islamic reformation and liberal ideas in Indonesia, besides
Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrachman Wahid. The three were activists of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Muslim Stu-
dents Association) who later promoted an inclusive interpretation of Islam. Rahardjo graduated from economics at the
UGM (Gadjah Mada University) and is now rector of Proklamasi University in Yogyakarta. Effendy is an interfaith activist
who served as secretary of state during Wahid’s presidency. Wahib died at the age of 31 but his book Pergolakan pemi-
kiran Islam (Turmoil of Islamic thought) inspired later generations on various issues from interfaith, inclusive theology, to
Islamic reformation.
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He completed his elementary education in Solo (1937–1940) and attended the Manba-u
al-Ulum madrasah in the same town in 1943. He was involved in the 1945 revolution
against the Dutch in Semarang, when he joined the Muslim group Hizbullah dan Sabilil-
lah, and was chosen as the head of the MPHS (Markas Pejuang Hisbullah dan Sabilliah/
Centre of the Army Hizbullah Sabilillah). He was also active in the Islamic Youth Move-
ment (Gerakan Permuda Islam Indonesia, GPII) when an elementary school teacher in
Ungaran. His book Mungkinkah negara Indonesia bersendikan Islam (Is an Indonesia
based on Islam possible?; 1950)10 brought him to the attention of Vice-President Muham-
mad Hatta and it also paved the way for his diplomatic career at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He served as a diplomat to Britain, USA, Sri Lanka, and Kuwait. Munawir Sjadzali
pursued further studies at the University of Exeter (1953–1954) in Britain and gained his
MA from Georgetown University, USA, with a thesis on ‘Indonesia’s Muslim parties and
their political concepts’ (Effendy 1995; Fitria 2012; Ilyas 2006; Sembodo 2005; Tobibatus-
saadah 2014). His career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rose from being a staff member
at the Middle Eastern section (1950), to third secretary of the Indonesian embassy in
Washington (1956–1959), first secretary of the Indonesian embassy in Colombo (1965–
1968), and finally, as ambassador in the United Arab Emirates (1976–1980). However,
the peak of his career was as Minister of Religious Affairs (1983–1993). He also wrote
several books on Islam and politics, and on Islamic law in the context of Indonesia
(Sjadzali 1995).
Whereas Driyarkara and Mukti Ali started their career as lecturers at religious higher
education institutions, Munawir Sjadzali had a long stint in international diplomacy when
attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As with his two counterparts, Munawir Sjad-
zali showed academic curiosity and was attracted to solving the enigmatic relationship
between religion and the state (Prasetyo 1994: 195). In addition, he was attentive to the
contextualisation of Islamic law ( fiqh) in Indonesia (Fitria 2012; Ilyas 2006; Sembodo
2005; Sjadzali 1988, 1991; Tobibatussaadah 2014) and modernising the Islamic court
and education system in Indonesia (Cammack 1997: 162). He deserves credit for improv-
ing the quality of the madrasah education system when he was Minister of Religious
Affairs (1983–1993) under Suharto as he sought to give the madrasah the same status
as state schools under the Ministry of Education. He played a vital role in broadening
the academic horizons of Islamic higher education in the country by sending Indonesian
lecturers to study at American, Australian, or European universities (Feener 2007a: 278).
The alumni of the schools became lecturers at the state Islamic universities, pursued MAs
and PhDs in universities within Indonesia and abroad (Aini 2015; Jabali and Jamhari
2003). Munawir Sjadzali can be considered a true heir of Mukti Ali for injecting an
Islamic reformation agenda through the government (see, for example, Sjadzali 1984a,
1984b).
Whereas Mukti Ali’s tenure was marked by the establishment of the MUI in 1975,
Munawir Sjadzali’s was marked by the government’s effort to curb religious radicalisation
by imposing Pancasila upon all movements and organisations in Indonesia as the sole
ideology. Between 1982 and 1983 Munawir Sjadzali played a vital and successful role in
communicating the government’s interest in Islamic organisations, such as NU and
Muhammadiyah. Most of the Islamic organisations accepted the government’s regulation
10Sjadzali uses nom de plume Ibn Amatillah M. Sj.
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(Sjadzali 1995: 78–82). Interestingly, he also accompanied Suharto on a pilgrimage to
Mecca in 1991, in one of the important efforts by Suharto to court Muslim communities
in Indonesia to stabilise his regime before stepping down. Since the late 1980s, Islam has
emerged again in Indonesian politics as a political issue.
The position of the three intellectuals
The religious and educational backgrounds of the three intellectuals, Driyarkara, Mukti
Ali, and Munawir Sjadzali, bear similarities. They were religious leaders who were
trained in both the East and West. They had traditional training in their respective reli-
gious foundations, studied theology, and went to the West for further studies. Due to
this rich experience and exposure to different cultures and traditions, they, unsurprisingly,
showed an open mind and broad perspective in the relationship between state and reli-
gion. What is also clear is that all three supported the secular state of Indonesia. With
their respective religious authority, the three provided vital ideological support for Suhar-
to’s New Order government. All three were involved in state administration. Whereas
Driyarkara did not use the state’s power to intervene for the Catholic community,
Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali used it to modernise Islam – and through both intellec-
tuals Suharto found legitimacy for maintaining power over a Muslim majority country.
Mutual benefits can be seen – Suharto enjoyed the support of the twoMuslim intellectuals,
and they in turn had state support to achieve their reform agenda for the Indonesian
Muslim community (Federspiel 1991: 235–9, 1998: 98). Thus, Driyarkara laid a theological
foundation for religious people to support the secular state, and Mukti Ali and Munawir
Sjadzali served as bridges between the New Order’s interest in stabilising national politics,
and the reformation of Islam.
It is worth recalling that during the New Order period, relations between Muslims and
Christians were some sometimes fraught as each side was suspicious of the other (Makin
2016b). Muslims were fearful that the secularisation agenda was being hijacked by their
Christian counterparts for their missionary activities. Similarly, the Christians were
afraid that Muslims harboured a clandestine agenda to create an ‘Islamic state’ (Meuleman
2011: 242; Mujiburrahman 2006). There are similarities in the arguments of Christian and
Muslim leaders in the defence of a secular state. In short, the three intellectuals discussed
here were religious men who stood on the side of nationalists, albeit from different reli-
gious positions. Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali, graduates of pesantren, reformed
Islamic modern higher education and its curriculum during their tenure as the Ministers
of Religious Affairs (Gunarto 2007: 53–70). The three lived in an era when the formation
of Indonesia as both a state and a nation took place at critical stages. The three intellectuals
experienced many transitions in the history of the nation: the end of Dutch colonial era,
and the Sukarno and Suharto periods. Only Munawir Sjadzali, however, was personally
involved in the war for the nation’s independence against the Dutch (Sjadzali 1995:
18–42). But all three were involved in the political and religious process during the
Sukarno and Suharto periods. It would seem that Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali contin-
ued the role of their Christian predecessor in the search to improve relations between the
state and religion. Their ideas are important in the study of Indonesian politics and reli-
gion because they formulated the relations of religion and state before Nurcholish Madjid,
Abdurrachman Wachid, Ahmad Wahib, Dawam Rahardjo, and Djohan Effendi who are
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known for their roles in nurturing secularisation, pluralism, and religious freedom in
Indonesia (Barton 1999; Effendy 1995).
Driyarkara: the state should not interfere in the citizens’ faith
In a critical period during which Sukarno sought legitimacy to promulgate Pancasila in
Indonesia, Driyarkara defended this state ideology by presenting his philosophical reflec-
tion on at a seminar on ‘Pancasila’ held in Yogyakarta on 17 February 1959. His paper was
later translated into English and disseminated to many Indonesian embassies abroad
(Driyarkara 1959, 2006b). In it, Driyarkara (2006b: 882; 2006c: 843) highlighted the
importance of faith in God by posing Max Scheler’s question: Was ist der mensch, und
was ist seine Stellung im Sein?’ (What is a human being, and what is his or her position
in his reality?) For Driyarkara, a human being is more than a combination of body and
spirit, but that as an individual he or she is also part of the human collective, based on
love and mutual respect. He further stated that in this relationship all human beings
deserve decent and equal treatment. In this vein, democratic principles should be estab-
lished in society. Driyarkara (2006b: 897, 2006c: 844) argued that all men and women,
as part of society, must work together since ‘democracy is a principle, by which the
members (of society) should respect each other, accept others, and work together, based
on the common interest.’11
Driyarkara further expanded that a nation should be built on the principle of the col-
lectivity and consider society’s best interest. Society, however, comprises various ethnici-
ties. The establishment of a state should guarantee the prosperity of all citizens equally,
regardless of ethnicity and faith. Furthermore, an individual in society should respect
other members. All members of society are citizens in a modern state, and should live
together as a single entity that encompasses ethnic religious groups (Driyarkara 2006a:
958; 2006c, 846).
As a religious man, Driyarkara stressed the role of God in human life and the way people
can reach the Creator by understanding what it means to be a human being, or more specifi-
cally, by understanding one’s own self. Driyarkara believed that a human being is God’s
reflection, an understanding commonly held by Christians (based on the Book of
Genesis) and Javanese mysticism. In this respect, he recalled the Javanese Serat Wijil: ‘He
who knows himself knows the most Mighty One who gives life; that is the noble path’12
(Driyarkara 2006c: 848). To approach God, according to Driyarkara, religion is needed as
it guides human beings to know his or her existence in the world, towards finding the
right path. Referring to the German Jesuit philosopher August Brunner (1894–1985),
Driyarkara held that individuals can find the meaning of their existence as a person and
as a member of society (Brunner 1956; Driyarkara 2006c: 852). For Driyarkara, the role
of religion for people cannot be denied, and were it rejected, other forms of activity
similar to that of religion will replace the function of religion (Driyarkara 2006c: 854).
11Demokrasi adalah prinsip, yang menyebabkan para warga masyarakat saling memandang, menghormati, menerima, dan
kerja sama dalam kesatuan sehingga masyarakat dapat bertindak sebagai satu subjek, yang menyelenggarakan kepentin-
gan bersama (Driyarkara 2006c: 844).
12In Javanese, ‘Sing sapa punika, weruh rekehing sarira, mangka saksat wruh sira maring Yang Widi, iku marga utama.’ It is
believed that Serat Wijil was originally composed by the East Javanese saint, Sunan Bonang (1465–1525), and was later
rewritten by Sultan Hamengkubuwono V (1820–1855). The Serat contains many Javanese Islamic Sufi teaching and can
found in the Sonobudoyo museum in Yogyakarta (Apriana 2015).
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Driyarkara then related what forms an ideal state and a plural society. Although human
beings are religious by nature, as was the case of Driyarkara himself, an individual needs a
state in which to live with other individuals, who often embrace different faiths. The state
in this respect should guarantee the prosperity of all people regardless of which faith they
embrace. Recalling Sukarno’s speech in 1945, the essence of Pancasila can be summarised
in the principle of gotong royong (cooperation)13 (Driyarkara 2006b: 875, 2006c: 859). The
term does not refer to a certain form of prayer based on a specific religious teaching, but to
cooperation among various people with different faiths (Driyarkara 2006c: 864–5, 2006d:
933). Driyarkara and Sukarno emphasised the nature of secularism in the founding of
Indonesia. While religion does make up the Indonesian identity, the separation of religion
and state from the beginning of Sukarno’s writing is clear (Soekarno 2005a).
Driyarkara often explained that although the state’s first principle is belief in One God,
it does not mean that all state and citizens’ affairs should be based on religious consider-
ation. The state and societal life are basically secular, which he calls ‘profane’: ‘Tetapi jan-
ganlah keliru. Dengan ini perbuatannya tidak beralih menjadi kebaktian (But do not be
mistaken. With all of this [the first principle of Pancasila], all state affairs do not
become religious rituals)’ (Driyarkara 2006b: 933). The idea of secularism is revealed in
Driyarkara’s statement that the state should not interfere in the faith and religion of its
people.
Di sini Religi tidak bisa dipaksakan oleh negara sebab Religi berdasarkan keyakinan, dan key-
akinan tidak bisa dipaksakan. Oleh sebab itu, negara juga tidak bisa mengatur dan memer-
intah cara-cara beribadat, bersembahyang, berpuasa, dan sebagainya. Kehidupan Religi tidak
masuk dalam tujuan negara yang berlangsung; negara tidak dapat mengurus kebatinan
manusia.
Here the state cannot impose a certain religion upon the people, because religion is based on
faith and faith cannot be forced. The state therefore should not regulate the way people
should pray, perform rites, fast, etc. Religious life is not part of the state’s goal, and the
state cannot interfere in citizens’ spiritual affairs.
(Driyarkara 2006b: 878; 2006c: 862; my translation)
The message seems to refute the idea that the term ‘certain religion’ refers to ‘Islam’ as it
was clearly stated in the Jakarta charter, with the words, ‘perform sharia by Muslims (men-
jalankan Syariat Islam)’ (Elson 2009). Driyarkara’s statement delegitimises the possible
greater role of Islam in Indonesia, by encompassing other faiths and religions, and not
just Islam that is embraced by the majority of Indonesians. Indeed, the debate on the
extent of the role of Islam in the political domain in Indonesia continues. Moreover,
during Sukarno’s period, revolts in the name of Islam against the government did
occur, such as the case of Kartosuwiryo (Formichi 2010, 2012). Suharto, however, was tac-
tical in suppressing any possible use of Islam to oppose his power (Temby 2010). After the
reform period (reformasi 1998–present), Islamic sentiment remains a potential tool to be
exploited in politics, and political Islam and conservatism resurged in this period on the
13Sukarno proposed the principles of the nation, encapsulated in Pancasila (Five Principles): nationalism, humanity or inter-
nationalism, democracy, social welfare, and cooperation (gotong royong). He further states that the most important prin-
ciple of gotong royong lies ‘in an equality between the have and have-not, between Muslims and Christians, and between
the native Indonesians and those of foreign descent’. Sukarno did not elaborate on religion or faith, but highlighted the
principles of nationalism and unity among diverse Indonesians and emphasising that gotong royong is the most crucial
part of Pancasila as it is the essence of all the other principles above (Soekarno 1964; Elson 2009; Latif 2011: 21).
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wave of democratisation and openness in Indonesia (Fealy 2004). Driyarkara’s statement
calling for the state to tolerate all theistic religions in the context of reformasi remains
elusive, as the Indonesian government during this period prosecuted many minority
groups, such as Lia Eden, Ahmadiyyah, and Syiah (Makin 2016b, 2016c, 2017). Driyar-
kara’s vision of religious freedom and state protection for all faiths, is an idealistic one
since the current Indonesian government fails to fulﬁl this role.
Driyarkara maintained that the state of Indonesia is secular, but it should not stand as
the enemy of religion and it is the religious citizens’ duty to guard the ‘secular’ Pancasila.
This position reflects the long debate in Indonesia since its independence. Between those
who demanded Islam as the official state religion and those who disagreed, a compromise
was reached in a rather unique way in that Indonesia neither negates the religiosity of its
citizens nor endorses a particular state religion.14 Indonesian leaders, such as Sukarno,
Hatta, and others, accommodated the factions (Elson 2009). The debate between secular-
isation and the greater role of religion remains relevant up to reformasi, so that the unique
middle path between secularisation and theocracy serves as the best compromise and sol-
ution (Budiyono 2014; Latif 2011: 47).
Mukti Ali: stressing only one religious tradition is dangerous
Like Driyarkara, Mukti Ali emphasised the role of religion in Indonesian society. He chose
a pragmatic solution to link religion and the state. Ali (1971: 36–7, 1972, 103–4) felt that
Islam, embraced by the majority of Indonesians, was in a position to serve the nation
building propagated by the New Order. His views on the spiritual dimensions of people
is comparable to that of Driyarkara’s since both agreed that the religious faith of citizens
is a critical element in building the nation. However, Mukti Ali noted that there are other
models of development other than the Western one which lacks spirituality. He empha-
sised that the larger role of religion inherent in Indonesian cultures and traditions
should be drawn on for character building and these should be interpreted more progress-
ively to serve as a driving force for nation building (Ali 1972: 9–10).
Mukti Ali was conscious, however, that what he meant by religion was inclusivity of
other religions in the archipelago and did not pertain only to Islam (Husin 2014; Ismail
2012). Additionally, he argued that stressing the dominant role of a single religious tra-
dition, for example Islam, would be detrimental for Indonesian development. For Ali
(1972: 20), the co-existence of diverse races, faiths, and languages enriches each other’s
traditions, and a religious tradition cannot isolate itself from others. Like Driyarkara
who stressed the principle of gotong royong, Mukti Ali also reminded Indonesians of
the importance of cooperation among diverse faiths and traditions (Steenbrink 1990:
153–9). Mere appreciation of other faiths is insufficient, as trust must be built among
all people of different faiths (Ali 1970: 40–1) to achieve national unity. This vital
concept of religious pluralism preceded those of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrachman
Wachid to whom Indonesian studies have paid attention (Barton 1999, 2010; Kull
2005; Makin 2012).
14Accommodation of various ideas or syncretism is commonly found Indonesian cultures and history. Geertz (1960, 1968),
and Hefner (1985) for instance, famously remarked on the intermingling of Javanese local culture and Islam. Soekarno
(2005b) is also known for his syncretic ideas of combining nationalism, Islam, and socialism (Yatim 1999).
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Whilst Driyarkara states that an individual is part of the human collective, Mukti Ali
goes further by stressing that the salvation of one religious group depends on that of
others with different faiths. Similarly, the prosperity of one group affects that of others.
A single person cannot achieve happiness.
Bangsa Indonesia yang berfalsafah Pancasila ingin membentuk negara kesatuan dengan tidak
membenci bangsa lain, yang segala sesuatu ingin dipecahkan secara perembukan dan permu-
syawaratan, untuk menciptakan suatu masyarakat yang adil dan makmur, yang tindak
lakunya selalu mengingat dasar-dasar perikemanusiaan yang beradab, yang didasarkan
kepada ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa.
Untuk inilah maka Indonesia baru yang ingin kita bangun itu tidak bisa dibangun oleh seke-
lompok ummat manusia yang beranggapan bahwa agama yang ia peluk itu harus dipeluk oleh
seluruh bangsa Indonesia. Demikian juga Indonesia baru itu tidak bisa dibina oleh sekelom-
pok ummat manusia yang menganggap bahwa agama adalah tidak penting, dan oleh karena
itu pembangunan harus dipisahkan dari unsur-unsur agama.
An Indonesian people which has Pancasila as its philosophical foundation aims at establish-
ing a unified nation within which there is no hatred towards other peoples, in which every
problem [faced by the nation] should be solved through discussion, in order to achieve a
prosperous and just society, in which all [citizens’] conduct should be based on humanity
and civilised ethics, with the basis of faith in one God.
To pursue this goal, the new Indonesia we want to build is not founded only by a group of
people who assume that their own religion should be embraced by the rest of Indonesians. By
the same token, the new Indonesia is not developed by a certain group who assume that reli-
gion is not important, so much so that the development programme must be divorced from
religious elements.
(Ali 1972: 20; my translation)
Mukti Ali’s position resembles that of Driyarkara in supporting the middle path. The ﬁrst
paragraph of the quote above highlights Driyarkara’s principle of gotong royong among
different faiths. The second paragraph explains the crucial role of religion in the state
and supports the NewOrder’s anti-communist propaganda, which has always been associ-
ated with atheism, that Indonesians resist (Heryanto 1999; Zurbuchen 2002). Thus, for
both Mukti Ali and Driyarkara, Indonesia is not a religious state, but it gives a vital
role to religion in the development of the nation.
Both Driyarkara and Mukti Ali have averred in effect that no society can survive
without religion (Ali 1971: 6–7) and that religion presents ethical values, according to
which individuals can contribute to society in achieving the goal of collective life.
Mukti Ali summarised the role of religion in the building of a national character and
the need for the state to modernise Islamic education, in accordance with the spirit of
progress:
1. Agama adalah dasar azasi bagi etika.
2. Manusia, menurut kodratnya, baik laki-laki maupun wanita, di Indonesia atau ditem-
pat lain, adalah religious.
3. Kepribadian Nasional Indonesia adalah Kepribadian jang ber-Ketuhanan Jang Maha
Esa.
4. Adalah suatu keharusan bagi tiap-tiap manusia Indonesia untuk mendjadi pribadi ber-
Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa.
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5. Harus diakui bahwa penjiaran agama Islam, chusunja jang dilakukan dengan djalan
pengadjaran dan pendidikan disekolah-sekolah jang teratur, kalu dibandingkan
dengan pengdjaran dan pendidikan pengetahuan-pengetahuan lainjja, adalah belum
memuaskan.
6. Wanita Indonesia, baik sebagai putri, istri, ibu, maupun sebagai anggota masjarakat
umumja, hendaknya berpegang teguh kepada Agamanja masing-msing sebagai
sumber dasar etika, dalam membentuk kepribadian Nasional Indonesia.
1. Religion is the basis of ethics.
2. Indonesian men and women are basically religious.
3. The national character is the character of faith in one God.
4. To believe in one God is obligatory for all Indonesian citizens.
5. Religious and particularly Islamic education, when compared with other forms edu-
cation, is not of a satisfactory standard.
6. Indonesian women, whether unmarried, wives, mothers or other members of society,
should hold religion as a source of ethics, an important element for building the
national character
(Ali 1971: 14; my translation)
Mukti Ali has argued that a secular Indonesian government, based on Pancasila, does not
pose an obstacle for Muslims. Being Muslim and Indonesian is a unique position which
can enrich individual spirituality and experience as a citizen of the country. This is in
line with Driyarkara’s stance in stressing that religious values have been embedded in
Indonesian culture and traditions in the form of local customs and norms.
Mukti Ali, a spokesperson of the New Order government bridged the government’s
interests and the Muslim community. He envisioned that Islam and state could work
together to cope with the challenges facing Indonesians, for example, through the edu-
cational and legal development programme (pembangunan, reform) in relation to
Islam, propagated by the New Order (Dja’far 2006; Meuleman 2011: 159–60). Mukti
Ali believed that the government would not be able to implement the programme
without the support of Muslims. Likewise, Muslims need government approval, for
example, to build mosques, hospitals and pesantren. Only commitment from both sides
would ensure the future of the nation.
Munawir Sjadzali: Indonesia is not an Islamic state
Unlike Mukti Ali who was interested in contemporary issues and the adoption of modern
Western approaches in assessing Islam, Munawir Sjadzali turned to classical Arabic
sources for understanding Islam. Based on his reading of both classical and modern
Arabic works, Munawir Sjadzali believed that Islam is not a political system which was
practised by the Prophet Muhammad, the four guided caliphs, and the Umayyad (665–
750) and Abbasid (750–1517) dynasties (Sjadzali 1990; Effendy 1995; Prasetyo 1994). In
line with the works of Husayn Haykal (1888 –1956) and ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–
1966), who advocated separation between state and religion, Munawir Sjadzali argued
that the Prophet himself did not prescribe a particular form of governmental system.
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Munawir Sjadzali calls for the examination of the way in which the Prophet led the
Medinan community in the 7th century (Effendy 1995: 113–16).
Tak lama setelah Nabi menetap di Madinah, atau menurut sementara ahli sejarah belum
cukup dua tahun dari kedatangan Nabi di kota itu, beliau mempermaklumkan satu
piagam yang mengatur kehidupan dan hubungan antara komunitas-komunitas yang meru-
pakan komponen-komponen masyarakat yang majemuk di Madinah. Piagam tersebut lebih
dikenal sebagai Piagam Madinah.
Banyak di antara pemimpin dan pakar ilmu politik Islam beranggapan bahwa Piagam
Madinah adalah konstitusi atau undang-undang dasar bagi Negara Islam yang pertama
dan yang didirikan oleh Nabi di Madinah.
Not long after the Prophet moved to Medina, or according to many historians after less than
two years of the Prophet living in the city, the Prophet declared a charter which regulated the
relation between communities, who were the main components of the complex Medinan
society. This charter is known as the Medinan charter.
One thing should be noted that the Medina charter, which many experts called the first pol-
itical charter serving as the first constitution of an Islamic state [does not mention the state’s
religion].
(Sjadzali 1990: 10; my translation)
The above quotation buttresses the position of both Driyarkara and Mukti Ali in arguing
that Indonesia should not be a religious state. Munawir Sjadzali’s presentation of the
history of Prophet Muhammad’s community in Medina aims at convincing Indonesian
Muslims that the state’s choice in distancing itself from religion is the right decision.
Munawir Sjadzali also delegitimises, if not silences, earlier Muslim leaders, such as
Natsir, who demanded the greater role of Islam in Indonesian politics (Majid and
Roem 1997; Noer 1983; Suhelmi 2002). Munawir Sjadzali highlighted that during the
period of the four guided caliphs – Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali b. Abi Talib –
there was no certain method of appointing the caliphs. Each of the four appointments
came about differently, based on a certain component of consensus (shura) among
Muslim leaders. However, not every consensus was reached openly, as Abu Bakr was
afraid of a possible rupture amongst the Muslim leaders, so the discussion among the
elite Companions of the Prophet was closed to the public. However, in the speeches
given by the caliphs, Munawir Sjadzali found a kernel of a ‘social contract’ between the
caliphs and the people. The four caliphs however, did not give clear instructions on
how to appoint a successor. Tragically, three of the four caliphs were murdered without
leaving an indication of who their successors should be. Thus, Munawir Sjadzali also
asked Muslims to be aware that Muslim politicians during this period, like current poli-
ticians, were political animals who made mistakes and were involved in Machiavellian pol-
itical manoeuvres (Sjadzali 1990: 234).
The two Muslim dynasties after the four guided caliphs – the Umayyad and Abbasid –
saw the expansion of Islamic government which went beyond the traditional Arab political
system. To Munawir Sjadzali, the influences of non-Arab traditions, for example, that of
the Byzantine and Persian, on the governance of these two dynasties are clear.
Mu’awiyah memerintah dari Syam, Damascus sekarang, dekat ibukota Byzantin, Konstanti-
nopel, Istambul sekarang. Dia banyak meminjam pola-pola pemerintahan dari kerajaan
Byzantin, termasuk atribut-atribut dan pola hidup raja tetangga itu.
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Mu’awiya (b.Abi Sufyan) ruled (the Muslim community) from Damascus, near Byzantium,
Constantinople, nowadays Istanbul. He borrowed some of Byzantine systems of government,
including attributes and the rulers’ lifestyle. Many formalities, and protocols (that were from
Byzantium), were applied.
(Sjadzali 1990: 37; my translation)
Munawir Sjadzali expounded on political theories proposed by many classical Muslim
intellectuals such as al-Farabi (872–950), al-Mawardi (972–1058), al-Ghazali (1058–
1111), Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), and Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). He was attracted to the-
ories such as that of al-Farabi concerning the ‘virtuous city’ (madina fadila) which echoes
Greek Platonic philosophy, and that of Al-Mawardi’s embryo of a social contract, which
he compares to the political theories of Locke and Rousseau. Besides Ibn Khaldun’s the-
ories on the birth of society and state, he presented the statement made by Ibn Taymiyya
that a just non-Muslim ruler is better than an unjust Muslim ruler (Sjadzali 1990: 110).
Munawir Sjadzali in the above quotation also rejected the Islamist political concept of
Abu A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), two ardent proponents
that Islam and state are inseparable (Ahmad 2009), a stance taken and contextualised
by M. Natsir in Indonesia. Natsir argued that Indonesian unity and nationalism were pio-
neered by the Islamic spirit, so much so that Indonesian Muslims are bound by duty to
implement Islamic rule in the country (Effendy 2003: 21–2). Munawir Sjadzali,
however, concluded that:
… bahwa dalam Islam terdapat seperangkat prinsip dan tata nilai etika bagi kehidupan ber-
masyarakat dan bernegara seperti yang kita temukan dalam Al-Quran, yang memiliki kelen-
turan dalam pelaksanaan dan penerapannya dengan memperhatikan perbedaan situasi dan
kondisi antara satu zaman dengan zaman yang lain serta antara satu budaya dengan budaya
yang lain.
Islam contains certain principles and values that guide how to live in a society or state, as
found in the Qur’an, but the application, and implementation of these are flexible, depending
on differences in the situation and condition from one time period and another, as well as
from one culture and another.
(Sjadzali 1990: 236; my translation)
Thus, Munawir Sjadzali felt it unnecessary for Muslims to establish an Islamic state. He
called on Indonesian Muslims to accept Pancasila as the state ideology, and particularly,
the ﬁrst of the ﬁve principles on the belief in one God, since it does not contradict the
teachings of all religions in Indonesia, including Islam. Unlike Mukti Ali whose writing
on the separation of state and religion is unclear, Sjadzali formulated more precisely
what he meant by Indonesia as a secular state. He opposed the Islamist M. Natsir
who argued for an Islamic state for Indonesia. Like Driyarkara, Munawir Sjadzali con-
tended that the current secular state is the best proposition for religious Indonesian
citizens.
A unique concept of Indonesian secularisation
The current debate on secularisation is faced with the fact that an absolute rupture of reli-
gion and state is not always relevant (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Casanova (2006: 7) pro-
poses three characteristics of secularisation: (1) decline of religious belief and practices; (2)
privatisation of religion; and (3) differentiation of a secular sphere. However, each country
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gives a unique picture in ways in which the practice of secularisation is dynamic. In
France, which is known for upholding the principle of laïcité, the current differentiation
of public space and religion needs redefinition, given that popular religions resurged
with the adaptation or commodification of religions to fit the secular space (Hervieu-
Léger 1990). However, despite religious revivalism in the past (Anderson 1995),
Germany is consistently secular as indicated by the decline of people’s religiosity and
that of the role of religious institutions (Wolf 2008). The United States, however, draws
a different picture in which religiosity and the role of religion cannot be ignored in
people’s life (Eisgruber 2006). Secularisation and religiosity are in some cases not indepen-
dent of each other due to a dynamic situation and trends in society; each of the two can
relate to, and depend on, the other (Clark and Grandchamp 2011). The growth of religion
in modern times can also be seen in South American countries (Becci and Burchardt 2013:
8–9; Casanova 1994). Indonesia, as mentioned, has rather a different trajectory given the
distinctive relation of politics and religion in the nation’s history.
Driyarkara, Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali, support religious plurality and did not
envision the decline of religion in public life or in Indonesia politics. Being religious
and holding faith in high regard, they underlined the importance of religion in the
public and private lives of Indonesians. While Driyarkara opposed state interference in
religious life and considered religion a private matter, Mukti Ali continued to emphasise
the role of religion as an ethical guide in political life. Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali
would seem not to agree with the complete separation of state from religion. Mukti Ali
saw the contribution of religion in the development of the nation and character building
particularly in the context of the New Order. During his tenure as a minister under Suhar-
to’s government, the MUI was founded and the reformation of Islamic education was
initiated. Munawir Sjadzali saw the importance of differentiating between the religious
and political spheres, as he rejected the idea of Islam as a political system. For Munawir
Sjadzali, Islam provides moral guidance for its adherents but a clearly prescribed political
system is not in the Qur’an. He felt that politics is a worldly matter as God has entrusted us
with a rational capacity to solve such problems (Effendy 1995; Prasetyo 1994). Munawir
Sjadzali continued Mukti Ali’s mission to modernise Islamic education and Islamic juris-
prudence through state intervention. It was during his tenure as Minister of Religious
Affairs that it became mandatory for all religious organisations to adopt the sole state
ideology of Pancasila.
Another similarity among the three religious leaders is their patriotic nationalist senti-
ment; they place national interest and unity before their respective faith. The three hold
diversity of religions in Indonesia in high regard.15 When Mukti Ali was asked whether
he was Indonesian or Muslim, he answered that he was an Indonesian Muslim, a state-
ment by which he meant that Islam still served as his identity (Tibi 1986: 34). Driyarkara,
though a Jesuit priest showed his nationalist sentiment clearly, as he regretted that when
the independence of the nation was declared on 17 August 1945, he had just arrived in the
Netherlands. He could do nothing but condemn the military aggression unleashed by the
Dutch after the independence of the nation (Danuwinata 2006: xxvii). Likewise, both
15In Indonesian scholarship, Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrachman Wachid have gained the most credit credit for devel-
oping the concept of pluralism, whilst earlier proponents like Driyarkara, Mukti Ali, and Munawir Sjadzali have been
forgotten.
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Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali were ulama16 who respected diversity of Indonesia. All
three religious figures had further education in the West and had worked for the
secular New Order government. Driyarkara and Munawir Sjadzali endorsed Pancasila
and rejected the idea of a religious state, whereas Mukti Ali supported a national develop-
ment scheme and character building in which religion plays a role in the Pancasila state.
Of the three, on the separation of state and religion, it seems that Driyarkara is the only
intellectual who consistently held this idea as both concept and praxis. Minority religious
groups in Indonesia, such as Catholics, support state secularisation, as in many general
elections they mostly voted for secular parties. The two Muslim intellectuals, Mukti Ali
and Munawir Sjadzali, did not abide by the principle of separation between state and reli-
gion. In practice, the two often used their political power to modernise the Islamic com-
munity and to secure the state’s interest in curbing radical and conservative ideology,
which is on the rise in the current political landscape of Indonesia (Makin 2015, 2016b,
2016c).
Recalling the three aspects of secularisation by Casanova (2006) mentioned earlier, it
seems that with Indonesia’s choice of a middle path, such a separation of religion and poli-
tics will fall short of fulfilment, as religion is ever present in the country’s public life.
Recent developments after reformasi, has seen a resurgence of religiosity and spirituality
(Howell 2001, 2007), as well as Islamic conservatism, radicalism, and orthodoxy
(Hefner 2000). Thus, the stance held by Driyarkara, Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali, is
even more relevant now as a reminder to Indonesians to return to the middle path
(Latif 2011).
The unique concept of secularisation in Indonesia does not deny the role of religion.
Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali used their positions as state ministers to modernise
the Islamic community, particularly in overhauling and modernising Islamic education
in the country. They injected Western curriculum (such as science subjects and pedago-
gical approaches to religious subjects) in the traditional religious schools (madrasah and
pesantren), and encouraged and supported Muslim students and lecturers in Islamic
higher education to study at Western universities. The results of their endeavours are evi-
denced in the enrichment of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals with progressive and liberal
ideas (Feener 2007a; Kersten 2015).
Another difference between Driyarkara and the two Muslim intellectuals lies in their
religious authority within their respective religious communities (ummah). Driyarkara
as a Catholic priest had the whole Catholic community as his audience. However,
Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali did not have grassroots connections with the Muslim
community. Rather, the two gained authority from the elite educated community in the
IAINs/STAINs administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Steenbrink 1990:
153–9). Their intellectual exercise (pembaharuan, reform) was addressed to students
and lecturers of these Islamic higher education institutions, whose graduates then
brought their progressive ideas to the grassroot level of the ummah in the pesantren,
madrasah, and the sub-district level of Islamic courts (KUA). Mukti Ali and Munawir
Sjadzali took the opportunity as Ministers of Religious Affairs to work at modernising
16Mukti Ali was known as a devout Muslim, inculcating similar values and practice in his family and who showed great
respect for his his teachers (Damami et al. 1993: 11–12). Similarly, Nurcholish Majdid, a renowned Muslim intellectual,
regarded Munawir Sjadzali as a traditional Islamic scholar (kyai) (Madjid 1995).
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Islamic education, the Muslim court system, and other fields. Rather than clearly separ-
ating state and religious affairs as understood in the concept of secularisation, the New
Order brought about educational reforms in Islamic education by improving the quality
of teaching, the curricula, and the library (Makin 2000). In fact, the New Order govern-
ment was not neutral with regard to the affairs of the ummah. If anything, it appears
that the government, was on the side of Western-educated Muslim elites whose agenda
of modernising the Islamic community coincided with its interest in taming the latent
threat of Islamist sentiment. Whilst Islamic radicalism was curbed during the three
decades of the New Order, as Islamic authority emanated from the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, and the MUI, pluralism in Indonesia is currently under attack by conservative and
radical religious factions. The current Indonesian intellectuals need to recall the ideas of
earlier leaders who promoted pluralism (Makin 2016a, 2016d, 2016e).
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